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Abstract
This study is aimed at providing empirical evidence on the association between audit tenure and
audit quality to support the argument of the enactment of regulation on audit rotation in
Indonesia. Using the theory of comfort perspective, this study focused on the person-to-person
relationship; that is the relationship between partners of the public auditing firm and the client
firm’s CEO; as well as on the relations at the firm level. Panel regression is employed to study
the association of audit tenure and audit quality. The results revealed the fact that the audit
partner and CEO tenure measured by the years of the audit contract has a negative association
with audit quality proxied by discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the tenure of the public
auditing firm and the client’s firm had a moderately significant positive impact on companies’
audit quality. The results imply that the regulation of audit partner rotation is needed to renew
the sense of comfort in terms of maintaining high audit quality.
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1. Introduction
Recently, there has been an issue of the expected decrease or diminishment of audit
independence due to the high relationship between the auditor and the firm’s top
management. A recent case is Tesco, one of the largest retail stores in the world. This
firm had an overstated profit of 263-million-pound sterling in September 2015, resulting
from the misreporting of a booking payment from the suppliers. The scandal of Tesco
resulted in the dismissal of some senior executives of the firm. Finally, this case was
investigated by SFO (a kind of anti-fraud institution in England). This condition has
triggered the disappointments among the investors in England and the United States of
America. It is interesting to note that in this case, the condition was not disclosed by the
auditor of Tesco, who was later known to have been the auditor of the firm for
approximately 32 years. From the aforementioned case, the government and the
investors may suspect that the case resulted from the close relationship between the top
management of the firm and the auditor, which led to the diminishing independence of
the auditor in carrying out the auditing service, this may potentially lead to legal
problems for the firm in the future. It may be even worse than that the firm may collapse
and become bankrupt.
In response to the aforementioned case, a great number of countries in the world have
issued specific regulations concerning the audit partner rotation to prevent such fraud.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an example of such regulations. This act was developed to
respond to the collapse of Enron. The content of Sarbanes-Oxley, in general, outlines
the regulations concerning the independence of the auditor. This includes such matters
as control of audit quality, audit partner rotation, and prohibition of conflict of interest.
In Indonesia, the regulation on audit partner rotation was initially formulated in the
Decree of the Ministry of Finance Number 423/KMK.06/2002 concerning the Public
Accountant Service. In the Decree, it was stated that the provision of audit service for a
financial report by an accounting firm to a client might be performed in maximally five
consecutive years, while the tenure of an audit partner in a public auditing firm is
maximally three consecutive fiscal years. Even further, the government has to improve
the regulations concerning the services by public auditing firms in order to prevent
unexpected incidences. The Decree of the Minister of Finance Number
423/KMK.06/2002 has been updated several times. The recent news on the relevant
regulations concerning the audit partner rotation is the intention of the Otoritas Jasa
Keuangan Indonesia (Indonesia’s Financial Service Authority) to formulate a new
regulation based on the results of studies and public opinion. In the draft of regulation,
the government intended to amend the prevailing regulation (Government Regulation
No. 20 of 2015 concerning the Practice of Public) into a revised version of regulation
limiting the tenure of the Audit Partners and Public auditing firms to be maximally 5
years and 10 years, respectively.
Usually, the high risk and the attention of the public and investors have urged the
academicians to undertake a further study. A number of studies have investigated the
relationship between the partners of public auditing firms and clients’ CEO and the
relationship to audit quality. Such researchers as Ghosh and Moon (2002) and Myers et
al., (2003) found that the longer tenure of the auditor would have an effect on the
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decrease of profit management in particular items. Another study was conducted by
Carey and Simnett (2006). They found that long tenure of audit has a consistent
relationship to audit quality. This study refers to the results of the study conducted by
Ball et al. (2015), who investigated the factor of interpersonal relationship between
Public auditing firm’s Partner and client’s CEO to audit quality using the samples of
firm’s financial reports in Australia during the last 9 years. Ball’s study revealed that the
audit quality would decrease when the interpersonal relationship between accounting
public firm’s partner and client’ CEO was intensely established. In Indonesia, a similar
study has been conducted by Novianti, Sutrisno, and Irianto (2009). Their similar results
revealed that when the interpersonal relationship between partner and client’s corporate
CEO was intensely established, it would lead to lower audit quality.
Although audit partner rotation regulation has been enacted and a number of studies
have been conducted, the effect of audit partner rotation on audit quality has been
debatable. Proponents of audit rotation suggest that audit rotation may lead to
improving audit independence. This proposition has been supported by some studies
such as the one conducted by Hamilton et al. (2005), revealing that audit partner
rotation may result in the decrease of discretionary accruals that further lead to better
profit management in the financial report. On the other hand, the opponents of audit
rotation suggest that mandatory rotation may lead to a decreased level of audit
competency, because the longer tenure of the audit may lead to better knowledge of an
auditor about the clients towards a better quality of audit output. Another study by St.
Pierre and Anderson (1984) confirmed that audit mistake and law-breaking acts of
auditor might occur at the initial year of audit contract.
Another research gap is the lack of an alternative perspective of auditing to explain the
audit rotation other than the positive agency perspective. This study aims at providing
empirical evidence of the relationship between audit quality and audit tenure to support
the arguments of the enactment of audit rotation regulation in Indonesia. Using the
theory of comfort as the sociological strand of auditing not much explored in previous
studies (Pentland, 1993; Power, 1999; Humphrey and Owen, 2000; Carrington and
Catasús, 2007), this research seeks to fill the research gap on the alternative theoretical
basis of audit rotation.
The main research question that emanates from this study is: Do the relationships
between audit partner and the CEO of the client company, as well as the relations at the
firm level, impact the audit quality? This study focuses on person-to-person
relationship, which is the relationship between a partner of public auditing firm and the
firm’s CEO. Although the focus is a person-to-person relationship, the researchers also
include the effect of tenure between the audit firm and the client’s firm, since they are
inseparable entities in the audit contract. In this study, the researchers take samples of
the whole non-financial public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
already audited by the public auditing firm. The observation years of this study were
2010-2014, which is in line with the maximum limit of the prevailing governmental
regulation on audit rotation in Indonesia.
2. Theoretical Review
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2.1 Theory of Comfort
The theory of comfort is an alternative perspective of auditing, to complement the
mainstream definition of auditing as an objective evaluation regarding assertions about
economic actions, views auditing as a ritualistic process of producing comfort at the
micro-level (Pentland, 1993). The activity of producing comfort enables the macrosystemic function of trust in numbers; in order to transform the financial statements
from an inherently untrustworthy state in the lack of trust society into a form that the
auditors and the public can find comfortable.
The concept of comfort is developed in nursing practice (Kolcaba and Kolcaba, 1991) to
provide comfort to patients and their families through comfort measures as the
interventions. The idea of relief from a discomfort state can also be applied in other
disciplines, including in auditing (Carrington and Catasús, 2007). Kolcaba (2003)
defined three technical senses of comfort relevant in nursing theory, from which the
application in auditing context was further delineated by Carrington and Catasús (2007)
as follows.
Table 1. Comfort state in nursing practices and respective auditing counterparts
Comfort state in nursing practices Application in the auditing context
(Kolcaba, 2003)
(Carrington and Catasús, 2007)
The state sense is all possible outcomes of Comfort as the state relates to the situation when the
comfort, which is determined by the relevant actors have been convinced and when it is time to
conditions that build comfort. The state close the books and give an audit opinion. Comfort as a
sense suggests that there are both comforts state highlights a case where sufficient efforts have been
and discomforts at any moment.
invested in being able to give an opinion. Most often, the
state of comfort determines at what state the audit
surpasses the line to produce a clean sheet. Consequently,
this view acknowledges that auditing is not about reaching
a 100% assurance of the audited number and that the
auditing rationale is to accept some discomforts. Comfort
as a state is about finding the situation where the auditors
are comfortable enough with the numbers to give a
(favorable) opinion.
The relief sense is the acts that relieve In auditing, the relief sense of comfort is understood as the
discomforts. By relieving discomforts, a acts that move the auditor from a state of uncomfort to a
non-acceptable state of comfort can be state of comfort. That is, comfort as relief frames what the
turned into an acceptable state. Relief refers auditors do to relieve from discomforts and become
therefore to the acts that aim at eliminating comfortable. The relief sense, consequently, highlights the
discomforts.
practice of audits and, more specifically, about teasing out
the acts that are obligatory to perform.
The renewal sense is a revitalization of how Translated into the audit setting, the renewal of the state of
comfort
is
perceived.
Renewal, comfort relates to new definitions of what is an acceptable
consequently, is about new perceptions of audit: what the auditor is comfortable with in one place or
acts that relieve from discomforts and new during one period might change. Renewing the audit has
perceptions of the state of discomforts and been at the forefront of the agenda for quite some time
comforts.
now. The debate on whether auditor rotations enhance
audit quality may serve as an example of the renewal sense
of comfort (Myers et al., 2003). The simple tenure–audit
quality relation suggests that an auditor is less likely to
sign a qualified audit report if s/he has been the company’s
auditor for a longer time. The argument rests on the idea
that there is no renewal of the level of where the auditor
reaches a state of comfort. Comfort as renewal concerns
the change in the definition that determines the state of
comfort.
Source: modified from Carrington and Catasús (2007)
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Based on Table 1, it can be seen that this study is more closely related to the renewal
sense of comfort, which is reflected in the debate on auditor rotation and audit tenureaudit quality association.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
This study measures the association between a partner of a public auditing firm and a
client’s corporate CEO. Previous studies have formulated the various contrasting
impacts of the relationship of partner. The first proposition suggests that longer
interpersonal relationship between the partner and CEO will have a negative effect on
audit quality. This is so because a longer audit contract may lead to a closer
interpersonal relationship between the auditor partner and the client’s CEO. The
interpersonal relationship may have a large impact on the independence of the auditor,
which may lead to lower audit quality (Mautz and Sharaft, 1961; Kaplan, 2004;
Gavious, 2007; Chi et al., 2005 in Fitriany, 2011). The second proposition suggests that
interpersonal relationship between partner and CEO may lead to a positive effect on
audit quality since there are many audit mistakes, errors, and law-breaking by the
auditor at the initial year of audit contract. It may also result from the fact that a new
audit contract has a larger budget, which may have an effect on the audit fee as a whole.
Another factor is that auditor has not understood the client comprehensively at the
initial year of audit contract, leading to higher audit risk at the initial year of the audit
contract. (Francis and Simon, 1987; Balvers et al., 1988; Beatty, 1989; Craswell et al.,
1995).
The two propositions are directly proven in previous studies. Results of the study
conducted by Ball et al. (2015) in companies in Australia for 9-year financial report
reveal that lower audit quality will result when the interpersonal relationship between
partner and client’s corporate CEO is intensely established. Ghosh and moon (2002) and
Myers et al., (2003) found that longer tenure of an auditor may affect profit
management decreasing at particular items. The study conducted by Carey and Simnett
(2006) found that longer tenure of the audit may have a consistent relationship to audit
quality. A similar study has been carried out by Novianti, Sutrisno, and Irianto (2009).
They found that lower audit quality might result when the interpersonal relationship
between partner and client’s corporate CEO is established. However, they disagree with
the implementation of mandatory audit partner rotation. They argued that the
replacement of a partner in the same public auditing firm would not have much effect
on audit quality as a whole.
Based on the studies above, although they have conflicting results, this study predicts
that there is a negative relationship between a longer interpersonal relationship between
audit partner and client’s CEO Client and audit quality. This study hypothesizes that the
relationship may be in the form of a negative relationship since the auditor is a
professional and competent auditor. Consequently, in the relationship between partner
and auditor, the factor of auditor’s learning experience on the client does no longer
exist. This is also consistent with the comfort theory lens: the long interpersonal
relationship brings about “comfort” in the numbers produced by audit clients hence
creating over the trust that hamper the audit quality.
This study also measures the relationship between a public auditing firm and the client’s
firm based on contract tenure. It is suggested that the relationship between a public
auditing firm and the client’s firm should have had a positive impact on audit quality.
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The result from a public auditing firm should have been more independent than the
result from a partner since the teamwork of public auditing firm is divided into several
teams and, since the teamwork of audit for each period of contract is rotated, although
the partner audit is still the same. Therefore, the independence problem is lower. Based
on previous studies, the relationship of public auditing firm which is counted on the
basis of tenure of public auditing firm also results in either positive or negative result.
The first proposition suggests that tenure of public auditing firm has a positive effect on
audit quality because the longer the tenure of the audit, the better understanding the
auditor has about the client, which may lead to better audit quality as a whole. The
finding is confirmed by De Crabtree et al. (2006) who suggest that longer tenure of the
audit may lead to the development of business knowledge to be the base for the
designing of the effective and high-quality audit program.
The second proposition suggests that tenure of public auditing firm has a negative effect
on audit quality since the longer the tenure of the audit, the closer relationship between
auditor partner and CEO will be, which leads to lower audit independence and lower
audit quality. One of the proponents of this proposition is study is Brooks et al. (2012)
who studied companies in the United States of America. The study found a negative
relationship between the tenure of public auditing firm and audit quality. Brooks
suggests that at the initial phase of the contract until the period of 12 years, there will be
an improvement of audit quality resulting from the improvement of auditor’s
understanding of the client’s firm. After passing the period, audit quality will decrease
in line with the improvement of the relationship between public auditing firm and client.
Wahyuni (2014) also studied the effect of audit tenure, audit specialization, and client’s
importance on audit quality. She suggests that tenure public auditing firm has no
significant relationship to audit quality in the period after the regulation limits audit
tenure in Indonesia.
Based on the explanation above, this study predicts that there is a relationship between a
public auditing firm and the client’s firm and audit quality. In spite of the different
results of the study, this study hypothesizes that the relationship may be positive due to
the aforementioned paradigm. The hypothesis is as follows:
H1: the interpersonal relationship
between the audit partner and the client’s
corporate CEO has a negative effect on audit quality
H2: the relationship between public auditing firm and the client’s firm
positive effect on audit quality

has a

Research Method
Considering that this study uses panel data, in the testing of the hypothesis of the study,
we employ multiple regression with the interaction variable. This study employs the
model employed in previous studies (Ball et al., 2015), to test the effect of the
interpersonal relationship between auditor partner and client’s corporate CEO. The
basic model is presented in the following:
ɛ
where:

51

AABFJ | Volume 13, no.4, 2019

AQ = Audit quality, or audit quality. This variable is measured by the level of earnings
management in the audit report based on Kim et al. (2002);
PartnerCEO = tenure of interaction between a partner of public auditing firm and
client’s corporate CEO, based on the number of years a partner is in contract with the
same CEO of a firm;
Audit firm = tenure of interaction between public auditing firm and client’s firm, based
on some years a public auditing firm is in contract with a firm. The calculated rotation is
real rotation;
MarketCap = firm size, based on the total asset of the firm at the end of the period.
Leverage = measured by comparing the ratio of long-term debt of the company to the
market price of a firm ’s equity
Return on Asset = measured by comparing the net income to a total asset of the firm
Age = age /duration of a firm listed in the Indonesian stock exchange.
Loss = dummy variable to indicate if a company is suffering loss at the initial period of
2010.
BigFour = dummy variable to indicate if a firm is in contract with a Big Four public
auditing firm in the year 2010.
Operational Definition
Dependent variable: Audit Quality (AQ)
In measuring the audit quality, this study employs the method of discretionary accruals.
The lower the score of discretionary accruals with the value of zero, the more neutral
the profit value reported in the financial report of the firm. The researchers employ the
model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) since Dechow et al.’s model (1995) is more
accurate than the original model introduced by Jones (1991). Besides that, the Model of
Dechow is designed to avoid the likelihood that Model of Jones is wrong in measuring
discretionary accruals when the discretion is estimated through revenue. Model of
Dechow is calculated with the following formula;
1
∆
∆
,
,
,
, /
,
,
,

,

,

Description of the aforementioned model variable is as follow;
TACC.i,t
= Total Accrual of firm i in year t
TAit-1
= Total asset of firm i in year t-1
ΔREVi,t
= income discrepancy of firm i between year t and year t-1
ΔRECi,t
= discrepancy of receivables of firm i between year t and year t-1
PPEi,t
= Gross fixed asset of firm i in year t
In this model, total accruals (TACC) are calculated using the approach of cash
flow, that is the discrepancy between net profit before extraordinary post and cash flow
from operation. The non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) are fitted value of the above
equation, while the discretionary accruals (DAC) are the residual value /error in this
model ( ,
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Independent variables: Relation between auditor and clients’ corporate CEO, and
the relationship between public auditing firm and client’s firm
In measuring the relationship between auditor and client, this study refers to previous
studies. Calculation of the relationship between partner audit and CEO of the client is
based on a number of years in which public auditing firm and client are respectively
represented by the same partner and CEO.
Meanwhile, in measuring the relationship between public auditing firm and client’s
firm, this study refers to previous studies related to the tenure of the audit. Those studies
are among others conducted by Ghosh and Moon (2005), Gunny et al. (2010) Lim and
Tan (2010), and Myers, et al. (2003). The relation between public auditing firm and the
client was measured by the firm-year of audit contract between a public auditing firm
and client’s firm. This point is adjusted to the Regulation of Finance Minister Number
423/KMK.06/2002 concerning the Audit Service, limiting the tenure of maximum 5
years.
Control Variables
Several control variables are used in this regression model due to the possible existence
of other determinants resulting from the adjustment of the financial report. This study
uses the same control variables as those used by Loyeung et al. (2014), as the basis from
Ball (2015).
Results and Analysis
Selection of Sample
This study uses the sample of companies listed in the JSE listed in the index of
Kompas100 in the period of February 2016 and July 2016. A sample of this study
consists of various Industries including the companies in the manufacture, cement,
construction, cigarette, pharmacy, fishery, and textile. In 2016, there were 100
companies listed in the index of Kompas 100. Samples were selected by considering if
the companies have met the criteria. A final number of sample of this study is 295.
Table 2. Selection of sample
Description

Number
firms

Companies listed in the index of Kompas 100 in the
period of February 2016 – July 2016
Financial / Investment Companies
Companies with incomplete data in the year 2010 – 2014
Companies reporting the financial report in currency
other than rupiah
Number of firm meeting the criteria of observation
2010-2014
Source: Data processed

of

100

Number
observation
(Firm Year)
500

(15)
(16)
(10)

(75)
(80)
(50)

59

295

of

Based on the table of sample selection, it can be concluded that the study uses data
balanced, meaning that the number of data is becoming the sample each year is fixed.
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The total number of companies meeting the criteria of observation from the year 2010 to
2014 is 59, which is equal to 295 firm years.
Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the descriptive statistic of the model used in this study. The
descriptive statistical analysis in this section will describe the value of each dependent
variable, independent variable, and control variable in this study. The main objective
of descriptive statistics is to extensively the investigated variables. In this section, a
table containing the mean, standard deviation, lowest and highest values of all variables
are presented. The results of descriptive statistics are presented in table 3, with the
following details:
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Model
Variable
Obs Mean
ABSDAC
Partner_CEO
FIRM
Market Cap
(in
Million
Rupiah)
Leverage
Age
ROA
Loss
Big4
Dummy variable
Loss
Big 4
Notes:
ABSDAC
Partner_CEO
FIRM
Market
Cap
Leverage
Age
ROA
loss
Big 4

Min.

Max.

0.088
1.498
2.766

Standard
Deviation
0.218
0.684
1.410

0.001
1.000
1

3.514
3.000
5

15500000

19300000

235021

140895000

0.436
17.827
0.823
0.051
0.542
% value 1

0.523
8.865
0.592
0.220
0.499

-1.393
-2.000
0.007
0
0
% value 0

3.550
37.000
2.843
1
1

5.80%

94.20%

53.62%

46.38%

Discretionary accruals (to measure Audit Quality)
Tenure of interpersonal partner-CEO
Tenure of public auditing firm - Client’s firm
Size of firm
The ratio of long-term debt to total asset
Age of firm in
Return on Asset
Firm’s financial condition of experiencing loss
Big 4 Public auditing firm

Model Testing
The regression testing for the model in this study has the Prob > chi2 value of 0.000,
(significant at 99%) meaning that it is lower than the alpha value of 0.05%. This result
indicates that at the interval confidence of 99%, independent variables used in the model
of this study that is ABSDAC and control variables of Partner_CEO, FIRM, Market
cap, leverage, age, ROA, loss, and Big 4 significantly and collectively has an effect on
the dependent variable of ABSDAC.
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Table 4. Regression Result of the Model
Regression Results of the model
Hypothesis
- Interpersonal relationship between audit partner and
clients’ CEO has a negative effect on Audit quality.
- Relation of public auditing firm and client’s firm has a
positive effect on audit quality
Model
Variable
Expected
Coefficient
P-value
Significance
results
Partner_CEO
+
.0414151
0.014
**
FIRM
-.0145443
0.070
*
AGE
.0008422
0.312
LEVERAGE
+/-.0442162
*
LOSS
+
-.3686209
0.001
***
BIG4
-.032164
0.146
MARKET.CAP(LN)
.002277
0.412
ROA
-.0036805
0.444
_Cons
.0079589
R²
0.4138
Prob > Chi2
0.0000
***
Level of significance 1%
**
Level of significance 5%
*
Level of significance 10%
when a variable has a positive coefficient on ABSDAC, then the
Notes:
variable will have a negative effect on Audit quality, and vice versa
(ABSDAC and Audit quality have an inverse relationship).

Discussion
The dependent variable used in the table is ABSDAC or discretionary accruals. Based
on the previous description, discretionary accruals can be described further as the
incentive for the management to manipulate profit. The descriptive statistic shows that
the mean value of ABSDAC is.0876503, although the score is relatively low, the score
shows the tendency that on average the firms in Indonesia perform profit management.
The minimum value of ABSDAC is .0012459, while the maximum value of ABSDAC
is 3.5143, implying that the firms in Indonesia listed in the index of Kompas 100
perform profit management practices, either by mark up the profit or mark down the
profit. The standard deviation of ABSDAC is 0.21765, where with the standard
deviation value higher than the mean implies various profit management practices.
The independent variables used in this study consist of two variables. They are
PARTNER_CEO and FIRM. The first independent variable and the focus of this study
is PARTNER_CEO, representing the tenure of partner and CEO. The descriptive
statistic reveals that the mean of PARTNER CEO is 1.498305, implying that on average
the firms in Indonesia listed in the index of Kompas 100 has the contract of 1.49 year.
The minimum contract is 1 year, and the maximum contract is 3 years. The standard
deviation lower than the mean implies that the contracts are not varied, where most of
the firms prefer to play in comfort zone, and thus have a contract of only 3 years,
although the government regulation already requires that partner may have a contract
for maximally 5 years. The second independent variable is FIRM, representing the
tenure of public auditing firm and client’s firm. Results of descriptive statistic reveal the
mean value of FIRM of 2.766102, implying that in average the firms in Indonesia listed
in the index of Kompas 100 practice contract with public auditing firm for 2.76 years,
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with the minimum contract of 1 year and maximum contract of 5 years. The standard
deviation of FIRM is also low, implying that the contract of public auditing firm and
client’s firm is not varied, although the tenure between public auditing firm and client’s
firm is more various than the tenure of partner-CEO.
Testing of Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis proposed in this study is the tenure of audit between of partner
public auditing firm and clients’ CEO. It shows a negative effect on audit quality. The
audit quality uses the earnings management proxy, calculated using the modified Jones
model. It is worth noting that previous results of profit management proxy have the
inverse relationship to audit quality, where the high value of ABSDAC indicates low
audit quality. Results of the testing of hypothesis 1 can be described as follow;
a.) Variable of Tenure of public auditing firm’s partner and Clients’ CEO
(PARTNER.CEO)
The table reveals that the tenure of partner-CEO calculated on the basis of firm-year of
the contract has a significant relationship at the level of 5% to audit quality using the
proxy of discretionary accruals (ABSDAC). This is implied in p-value/2 of 0.014,
indicating that Partner-CEO has a significant effect on ABSDAC with the significance
level of 5%. The direction of the relationship between partner-CEO and ABSDAC is
positive, as expected in this study. The significance and coefficient in a whole are in
line with the hypothesis proposed in this study. Results of the study reveal that tenure of
public accounting firm’s partner and client’s CEO will have a positive effect on firm’s
discretionary accruals, leading to negative impact on firm’s audit quality in a whole.
This is because the interpersonal relationship between the public auditing firm’s partner
and client’s CEO tend to reach the interaction level that allows the auditor to lose the
independence as the auditor leading to the lower audit quality. Results of this study are
consistent to results of previous studies conducted by previous researchers such as Ball
et al. (2015) who found that lower audit quality would result when the interpersonal
relationship between partner and client’s CEO is established. Results of this study are
also consistent to the study conducted by Novianti, Sutrisno and Irianto (2009) who also
found the same results, where lower audit quality may result when the tenure of partner
and CEO is longer.
Control variables
Control variables Market cap, leverage, age, ROA, loss, and big4 are not found to have
the association to ABSDAC except Leverage and loss. This is implied in p-value higher
than 0.05. The direction resulting from the control variable is the same as expected. It
can be concluded that all control variables other than loss used in this study have no
significant effect on audit quality since there are many other factors having an effect on
audit quality as a whole. The variable of LOSS has a significant effect on audit quality,
with a p-value of 0.002, (lower than 0.05). This may be due to the fact that the
management (agent) would like to minimize the impact of the signal delivered by the
financial report concerning the loss. It can be explained further by the signaling theory.
Meanwhile, the variable of Leverage has a significant effect on audit quality having the
P-Value of 0.098 (lower than 0.10). This finding is consistent with the expected result
of the study, where Leverage can have a positive or negative effect on audit quality. The
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variable of Leverage has a positive effect on audit quality as suggested by DeFond and
Jiambalvo (1994). They claim that firms with a high level of debt have incentives to
artificially increase the profit to meet the debt covenant.
From the description of the regression of hypothesis 1, it can be concluded that
hypothesis 1 in this study is accepted. The relationship between public auditing firm’s
partner and clients’ CEO has a negative effect on audit quality.
Testing of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 in this study is tested using the same model as hypothesis 1 in this study.
Because the two employ the same model, the test of the determinant coefficient and F
test are not conducted in the testing of the second hypothesis since the use of the same
model will lead to the same results. The following is the results of regression for the
second hypothesis;
a) Variable of tenure of public auditing firm and client’s firm (FIRM)
The table shows that the variable of tenure of the firm (FIRM) calculated on the basis of
the firm-year of the contract has a significant relationship at the level of 10% to audit
quality using the proxy of the discretionary accruals (ABSDAC) as implied in the pvalue/2 of 0.070. It implies that tenure of public auditing firm and client’s firm has a
significant effect on ABSDAC with the significance level of 5%. The direction
resulting from the relationship between the variables of partner-CEO and ABSDAC is
negative, as expected in this study. The significance and direction of the coefficient in a
whole have been consistent with the hypothesis proposed in this study. Results of this
study imply that tenure of public auditing firm and client’s firm has a negative impact
on the firm’s discretionary accruals, which will lead to positive impact on firm’s audit
quality as a whole. This results from the fact that a public auditing firm is more resistant
to independence than Partner. The resistance result from the division of public auditing
firm team into some further smaller teams. Another contributing factor is the rotation of
the audit work team of each period of the contract for the same audit partner. This may
lead to a lower level of independence. Still, another factor is that the longer the tenure of
the audit, the auditor will have a better understanding of the client, which in turn will
improve the audit quality as a whole. As a whole, this study is in line with the
proposition of the study conducted by De Crabtree et al. (2006) revealing that longer
tenure of the audit will lead to better business knowledge to be a good basis for the
designing of the effective and high-quality audit.
From the description of the regression of the model, it can be concluded that hypothesis
2 in this study is accepted. The relationship between public auditing firm and the
client’s firm has a positive effect on audit quality.
Conclusions
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the relationship between
audit quality and tenure of the audit to justify the enactment of the audit rotation
regulation in Indonesia. This study focuses more on the person-to-person relationship,
which is the relationship between a partner of public auditing firm and the client’s
CEO. Although the focus is a person-to-person relationship, the researchers also
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include the effect of tenure between public auditing firm and client’s firm, since they
are inseparable entities in the audit contract. In this study, the researchers select samples
of all non-financial public firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange that have been
audited by the public auditing firm. Years of observation in this study range from 20102014, following the maximum limit of government regulation concerning audit rotation.
In this study, the sample includes the firms listed in JSX listed in the index of
Kompas100 in the period of February 2016 and July 2016. The sample of this study
comprises various types of industry, ranging from manufacture, cement, construction,
cigarette, pharmacy, fishery, and textile. In 2016, there were 100 firms listed in the
index of Kompas 100.
The dependent variable in this research is discretionary accruals. Based on the previous
explanation, discretionary accruals can be described further as the incentive of the
management to manipulate the profit. Results of descriptive statistics reveal that the
mean value of discretionary accruals is relatively low. However, it reveals a tendency
that on average the firms in Indonesia practice earnings management.
Independent variables used in this study consist of two variables. The first is the tenure
of audit partner and client’s CEO. Results of descriptive statistic show that the
minimum contract is 1 year and the maximum contract is 3 years. Lower standard
deviation than the mean implies that the variation of the contract is apparent, where
most firms prefer to operate in comfort zone, by establishing the contract with a partner
for only 3 years, although the government regulation has determined that partner may
establish a contract of maximum 5 years. The second independent variable is the tenure
of public auditing firm and client’s firm. Results of descriptive statistic reveal that in
average the firms in Indonesia listed in the index of Kompas 100 perform a contract
with public auditing firm for 2.76 years, with a minimum contract of 1 year and
maximum contract of 5 years. The standard deviation is also low, implying that contract
of public auditing firm and client’s firm is not various, although the tenure between
public auditing firm and client’s firm is more various than the tenure of partner-CEO.
Results of hypothesis testing show that tenure of partner-CEO has a moderately
significant positive effect on discretionary accruals while the firm tenure has a negative
effect as expected in this study. Significant result and coefficient direction as a whole
are consistent with the hypothesis proposed in this study. This study implies that the
regulation of audit partner rotation is needed to maintain a high audit quality. This is
also consistent with the theory of comfort as the theoretical lens of this study: that audit
rotation on the partner can result in a renewal of comfort due to new insights bring in
the process of audit.
It is suggested that further studies perform further refinement on this issue. First, by
using another proxy of audit quality to better represent audit quality, such as EarningsResponse Coefficient, while including the compliance with the prevailing regulations.
Second, performing further test per industry considering the different characteristics of
the industries. It is also important to incorporate other factors expected to have an effect
on audit quality, such as corporate governance and internal factors at the firm level. And
last but not least, performing studies using the data of the financial industry may
generalize the results to other industry.
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